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STRUCTURING LICENSE AGREEMENTS
WITH COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL
DIFFICULTY
SECTION 365(n)-DIVINING ROD OR
OBSTACLE COURSE?
MARJORIE F. CHERTOK*
In 1988, Congress enacted the Intellectual Property Licenses
in Bankruptcy Act (the "Act").1 The purpose of the Act was to
protect licensees from loss of their vested research, development,
manufacturing, and marketing interests in intellectual property
when a licensor files a petition for relief under the United States
Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). Congress believed, and rightly so,
that absent legislation, the debtor's ability to reject a license agree-
ment as an executory contract would have a "chilling effect" on the
development of intellectual property.2 Accordingly, it adopted leg-
islation that modifies section 365 of the Code, which governs the
debtor's right to assume or reject executory contracts and un-
expired leases, by allowing licensees to contract for significant de-
viations from rights previously granted debtor-licensors under the
Code. In fact, the Act authorizes licensees to enter into agreements
with financially troubled licensors of intellectual property, elimi-
nating the "cornerstone" rights typically afforded to debtors. 3
* B.A. Economics and Computers 1981, Brooklyn College; J.D. 1984, St. John's Univer-
sity School of Law. Marjorie F. Chertok, Esq., is associated with the law firm of Greenbaum,
Rowe, Smith, Ravin & Davis in Woodbridge, New Jersey. Ms. Chertok practices in the area
of bankruptcy law, creditors' rights, and commercial litigation. Ms. Chertok, the author,
gratefully acknowledges the assistance and support of her colleague, Eric Cohn, Esq., who is
also a bankruptcy practitioner and commercial litigator.
Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2583 (1988).
2The disincentives to dealing with financially-troubled licenses include the inability to
use intellectual property after the filing date and the potential elimination of negotiated
terms of the license agreement, including trade secrets, exclusivity, and escrow provisions.
3 See S. REP. No. 100-505, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao hw. NEws 3200, 3205-08 [hereinafter S. REP.]. These cornerstone rights include
the following: (1) the debtor's right to stay proceedings which seek possession or control of
property of the estate; (2) the debtor's right to assume or reject executory contracts; (3) the
debtor's and creditor's right to notice and a hearing prior to obtaining or transferring assets
of the estate; and (4) the debtor's right to avoid enforcement of ipso facto clauses. Id.; see
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The Act, unlike the other sections of the Code, can only be
enforced if an agreement detailing the licensee's rights in the event
of the licensor's bankruptcy exists prior to the bankruptcy filing
and if the licensor rejects the license agreement as an onerous ex-
ecutory contract. Absent an agreement protecting the licensee's
vested right to use intellectual property in the event of the licen-
sor's bankruptcy, the licensor may reject the license agreement and
eliminate any vested rights held by the licensee. Although an
agreement protecting the postbankruptcy rights of the licensee is
essential to the licensee's ability to enforce the Act, neither the
Act, the legislative history, nor judicial authority provide licensees
with guidance for drafting such agreements.
This Article examines the case law decided prior to the enact-
ment of the Act, the legislative intent of its enactment, and the
Act's provisions in order to determine whether the Act provides
licensees with a true road map for drafting license agreements, or
rather, an obstacle course fraught with potential litigation issues.
During our journey through the provisions of section 365(n), we
will provide the licensee with drafting suggestions to expedite the
bankruptcy process. In addition, we will point out potential obsta-
cles from which may emerge preference, fraudulent transfer, bank-
ruptcy, and criminal litigation. Finally, since the Act only allows
the licensee to structure agreements that protect it from debtors
who reject license agreements as executory contracts, we will dis-
cuss what may be the licensee's worst nightmare-assignment of
the license agreement to an undesirable business partner.
I. PRE-ACT PRECEDENT-CONFLICTING TREATMENT OF LICENSE
AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 365(a) OF THE CODE
Section 365(n) was incorporated into the Code provisions cov-
ering the assumption and rejection of executory contracts to
counteract the "chilling effect" that the rejection of contracts has
on the development and marketing of intellectual property.4 This
chilling effect was recognized by several courts as the inability of
licensees to protect their business interests when they became
"technology-dependent" upon a bankruptcy licensor. These courts
urged legislative reform. As the provisions stood, these courts
also 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 363, 365(a), 365(e) (1979 & Supp. 1991).
4 S. REP., supra note 3, at 2-3.
See infra notes 8-19 and accompanying text (case law favoring bankrupt licensors
1046 [Vol. 65:1045
STRUCTURING LICENSE AGREEMENTS
were compelled to reject all vested rights in technology held by
licensees, even if the effect was to bankrupt the licensee or to dis-
courage venture capitalists from investing in high technology. Al-
though this viewpoint has merit, other courts have recognized that,
notwithstanding the executory nature of license agreements, equi-
table procedures may be fashioned that effectively protect the
licensees' right to use intellectual property critical to its opera-
tions.' To understand the motivation of the Act's drafters and its
industry supporters," prior case law on both sides of the issue
should be examined.
A. Case Law That "Chilled" the Development of Intellectual
Property
Congress cited Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Fin-
ishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.),8 as a catalyst
for the Act. In Lubrizol, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that absent statutory modification, the bankruptcy courts
must unconditionally reject license agreements for intellectual
property.9 Accordingly, the Lubrizol court called upon Congress to
modify section 365 of the Code to protect licensees from loss of
their vested interest in intellectual property caused by a debtor-
licensor's rejection of a license agreement. 10 A discussion of the
hardship that the court felt compelled to inflict upon the licensee
will illustrate whether it was the rejection of the license agree-
ments or the failure of the courts to fashion equitable remedies
that had a "chilling effect" on the development of intellectual
property."
In Lubrizol, the licensee Lubrizol entered into a license agree-
ment with the debtor that authorized Lubrizol's nonexclusive use
before enactment of § 365(n)).
6 See infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text (case law favoring licensees before en-
actment of § 365(n)).
1 See S. REP., supra note 3, at 2. It is apparent from the legislative history that the
drafters of the Act were assisted by high-technology and business lobbyists concerned with
the risks of dealing with start-up companies. The author believes that the effect of this
lobby may have been to disregard, to some extent, the interests of licensors.
8 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1057 (1986).
9 Id. at 1046.
10 Id. at 1048.
n See id. The Lubrizol court noted that allowing rejection in such cases could have a
"general chilling effect upon the willingness of such parties to contract at all with businesses
in possible financial difficulty." Id.
1991] 1047
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of a metal-coating technology. This technology was the backbone
of Lubrizol's business. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit, in af-
firming the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, held that rejection of the license agreement was a
sound exercise of the debtor's business judgment. 2 Indeed, the
metal-coating process that was subject to the licensing agreement
was the debtor's principal asset. Therefore, the unfettered sale or
licensing of that technology represented the primary source of
funds that would enable the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy.13
In holding that the debtor's unilateral rejection of the license
agreement was a valid exercise of business judgment, the court ob-
served that section 365 did not authorize the court to weigh the
potential harm to the licensee. 14 Therefore, absent modification of
the Code, debtor-licensors may reject licenses of intellectual prop-
erty as executory contracts and eliminate the licensee's right to use
the intellectual property and to enforce trade secret, exclusivity,
and escrow agreements.' 5 The Lubrizol court acknowledged that its
decision would have a "chilling effect" on the development of intel-
lectual property and would result in ruination of the licensee's bus-
iness; nevertheless, it held that section 365 mandated rejection of
the license. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit called upon Congress
to rectify this problem."
Similarly, in In re Logical Software, Inc.,'1 the bankruptcy
court affirmatively rejected the argument that the debtor's ability
to exercise its business judgment by rejecting a license agreement
should be subject to a balancing of the equities between the
debtor's and the licensee's best interest.'" Instead, the court au-
thorized the rejection of a license agreement for computer
software, even though the licensee's business was based entirely
upon its use of the debtor's software and the surrender of a supple-
12 Id. at 1047-48.
1" See id. at 1047; see also In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 Bankr. 683, 687 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1986) (court allowed debtor to reject exclusive license even though rejection resulted
in complete ruin of licensee); In re Laser Disc Computer Sys., Inc., No. 85-00535-L, slip op.
at 6 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 8, 1985) (court allowed debtor to reject exclusive license of
software under business judgment test).
"' Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
15 See id.
16 Id. The court stated that "Congress has plainly provided for the rejection of execu-
tory contracts, notwithstanding the obvious adverse consequences for contracting parties
thereby made inevitable." Id.
1 66 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
Id. at 687.
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mental code developed by the licensee.19
B. Case Law That Balanced Equities Between Creditor Interests
and Fostering the Development of Intellectual Property
Although the legislative history conveys the impression that
courts did not recognize the licensees' vested rights in the intellec-
tual property prior to the Act, in reality, this nonrecognition was
not completely true.20 For example, in Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver
(In re Select-a-Seat Corp.),21 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit balanced the equities between the debtor-licensor and the
solvent licensee. Unlike Lubrizol, the Silver court did not require
the licensee to return the technology after rejection of the technol-
ogy license.2 As a result, the rejection merely eliminated the li-
cense provisions regarding exclusivity and the licensor's continuing
warranty obligations.
Similarly, in In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co.,23 the bank-
ruptcy court balanced the benefit that the bankrupt estate derived
from the rejection of the contract against the potential harm suf-
fered by the licensee. In Petur, the license provided that, in the
event of bankruptcy, Petur, U.S.A. was to provide Petur, Canada
with the following: (1) certain techniques and skills regarding the
technology; (2) the right to sell its inventions to Petur, Canada at a
certain percentage of production cost; (3) sixteen hours of consult-
ing services per month; and (4) a promise to refrain for twenty
years from licensing its technology to another company for use in
Canada.24 The debtor sought to reject the license in order to
relicense the product in Canada. The court determined that the
rejection could be allowed only if the benefit to the estate's un-
secured creditors outweighed the potential harm to the licensee.2 5
Accordingly, the court denied the rejection of the contract because
there was no evidence that the potential increased income from the
rejection would materialize.26
19 Id. at 685.
20 See S. Rep., supra note 3, at 2-3.
21 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
22 Id. at 292.
23 35 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
24 Id. at 562.
25 Id. at 563-64.
26 Id. at 564.
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In Robertson v. Pierce (In re Huang),7 the court also applied
a balancing test and rationalized that
it is proper for the court to refuse to authorize rejection of a lease
or executory contract where the party whose contract is to be re-
jected would be damaged disproportionately to any benefit to be
derived by the general creditors of the estate as for example
where most of the "benefit" of rejection of the contract would be
captured by a third party at the expense of the unsecured
creditors.28
Taken together, these cases clearly demonstrate that it is possible
for courts to fashion equitable remedies that protect the bank-
rupt's right to reject the license agreement without irreparably
damaging the livelihood of the licensee. Such judicial remedies
have a great advantage over any statutory enactment because these
remedies are not dependent upon the express terms of the license
agreement. Moreover, courts can limit the protections afforded
licensees to those that enforce the licensees' vested rights to jointly
developed technology, specialized technology, or hardware devel-
oped for use in conjunction with the licensed technology, while dis-
regarding the perhaps overreaching terms of the license agreement.
Indeed, even though the Act gives licensees broad powers to struc-
ture terms of license agreements to survive rejection under section
365(a), courts will still be called upon to enforce these agree-
ments.2 9 In doing so, they may apply the equitable remedies fash-
ioned by the courts in Select-A-Seat, Petur, and Huang.
C. A Nonstatutory Solution- Contractually Separating Vested
Technology Rights and Executory Obligations
Commentators have observed that the Act would have been
unnecessary if contracts such as license agreements were viewed as
an exchange of two assets: (1) the executory rights and obligations
"1 23 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985).
28 Id. at 801.
9 The legislative history appears to encourage judicial scrutiny of license agreements.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1012, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. REP.] ("HR
5348 does not change the requirement under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §
365(a)) that a trustee's decision to reject an executory intellectual property license agree-
ment is subject to court approval"); S. REP., supra note 3, at 9 ("This bill is intended to
restore confidence in the system of intellectual property licensing, and courts interpreting it
should be sensitive to the reasonable practices that have and will evolve among parties seek-
ing to add to the technological and creative wealth of America.").
1050 [Vol. 65:1045
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under the license agreement; and (2) the licensor's vested property
right in the underlying technology.30 Because executory contracts,
as defined by Professor Countryman, are contracts in which per-
formance remains due on both sides,31 it follows that rights in the
underlying intellectual property cannot be "rejected" because
these rights ceased to be executory contractual obligations at the
inception of the license. 2 Rather, these rights vested when the
technology was transferred from the licensor to the licensee. Under
this analysis, a debtor may either assume or reject the executory
rights and obligations under the license agreement, such as the
duty to provide system support or maintenance, without affecting
the vested rights and legal obligations of the parties in the under-
lying intellectual property.
This characterization of a license agreement is appropriate in
the area of intellectual property because in that discipline licenses
generally involve two considerations:
(1) the delivery or promise to deliver products from the man-
ufacturer to the marketing agent under terms that may or may
not convey ownership of the product; and
(2) an agreement by the marketing agent to promote, dis-
tribute, or use the product within specified restraints, making
payments to the original owner.33
Clearly, the preceding analysis requires that every license be
examined to determine whether the parties intended to convey a
vested property right. For example, when a tear-away license for a
computer game is given to one million teenagers who own personal
computers, it would be ridiculous to assert that the debtor-licensee
may reject the license agreement because the contract is executory
in nature. In that situation, it is obvious that an executed transfer
"I See Andrew, Executory Contracts: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLo. L. REV.
845, 916-19 (1988).
31 Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
(1973). Countryman, in his frequently cited law review article, defines an executory contract
as "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the
contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute material breach excusing the performance of the other." Id.
32 See, e.g., In re Prime Motor Inns, 124 Bankr. 378, 383 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (grant-
ing debtor's motion to reject executory management agreement, but requiring new agree-
ment to include certain provisions); Zenith Laboritories v. Security Pac. Nat'l Trust (In re
Zenith Laboritories, Inc.), 104 Bankr. 667, 672-73 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (bondholders may
declare debtor in default and draw upon letter of credit upon filing bankruptcy petition
because agreement which triggered liability was not executory contract).
3 R. NmmR, THE LAW OF CoMpuTER TECHNOLOGY I 5.02, at 5-3 (1985).
1991] 1051
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1045
of ownership rights was intended. Conversely, when a license for
use of a process is granted to a manufacturer so that it may use
this process in its day-to-day business operations, a question arises
as to what ownership rights were intended to be conveyed as part
of the license.
To determine whether a license or a portion thereof should be
treated as an executory contract when a party to the license files
for bankruptcy, it is argued that the conveyance of the indicia of
ownership should be governed by the definition of property under
section 541 of the Code.34 This definition is much broader than the
definition applied in copyright or patent license contracts because
it includes "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor [and per-
haps the non-debtor under 365(n)] in property. 3 5 Under this defi-
nition, the licensee most certainly has an interest in the property.
Indeed, this equitable interest is more substantial if the licensee's
entire business is based upon use of technology or incorporation of
the technology into a finished product for resale to third parties.
3, See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
15 Id. § 541(a)(1). This contention is supported by the legislative history which provides
the following clear statement of intent:
The bill provides for treatment of intellectual property licenses under Section
365 in a manner that parallels generally the treatment of real estate leases in the
existing provisions of Section 365(h)(1). While intellectual property plays a unique
role in technological and economic development, the problems associated with re-
jection of executory contracts are common with other special forms of property,
such as real property leases. In both real estate leases and intellectual property
licenses, the underlying property is unique. When the lessee or the licensee is
threatened with loss of use of the property, it is not possible to obtain precise
cover from another source.
In adopting the Code, Congress recognized this problem with respect to real
property leases and enacted Section 365(h). That section clarified that, although a
bankrupt lessor could avoid performance of future obligations under an unexpired
lease, it could not cause through rejection of the lease an innocent lessee to forfeit
the remainder of its leasehold. Neither the bar nor Congress then foresaw the
need to protect similarly the reasonable expectations of intellectual property
licensees. The bill corrects the perception of some courts that Section 365 was
ever intended to be a mechanism for stripping innocent licensee of rights central
to the operations of their ongoing business and stripping the American licensing
system of its dependability and flexibility. Thus, the bill does not accord special
treatment for intellectual property or the interests of its licensors or licensees be-
yond that which Congress has recognized in the past is required for these other
unique property rights. The bill recognizes that there may be circumstances in
which the future affirmative performance obligations under a license cannot be
performed in a manner that benefits the estate, but limits the consequences of the
breach or rejection of the contract.
S. REP., supra note 3, at 4-5 (emphasis added).
1052
STRUCTURING LICENSE AGREEMENTS
The legislative history clearly provides that if technology is critical
to the continued operation of a licensee's business, and the royal-
ties are substantial enough to reflect a purchase of an interest in
intellectual property, a property right has been transferred.38 To
protect this property right and effectuate a complete transfer of
legal and equitable interest in the intellectual property, the license
agreement must define the irrevocable rights transferred at the in-
ception of the agreement, the consideration given for this property
right, and the remedies available upon default. These rights should
be secured by the intellectual property as collateral or by a letter
of credit that can be drawn upon in the event of a default.
3 7
II. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THE CONFLICTING TREATMENT OF
LICENSE AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 365(a)
In 1988, Lubrizol and its progeny were brought to the atten-
tion of the judiciary committees of the House and Senate. After
hearings attended by members of the bankruptcy bar and techni-
cal community, Congress concluded that the then-existing prece-
dents were insufficient to protect and foster the development of
intellectual property. Accordingly, Congress accepted the recom-
mendation of the Lubrizol court" and enacted legislation designed
to protect licensees and thereby encourage technological
innovation.
A review of the legislative history indicates a Congressional
awareness that the tension between the federal policies underlying
the Bankruptcy Code, and those behind the Patent Code and
Copyright Act, necessitated modification of the Code. For example,
one of the policies behind the copyright and patent laws is encour-
agement of access to intellectual properties through the payment
of royalties. Absent legislation, the right to reject a license agree-
ment would give debtor-licensors a stronger monopoly than the
drafters of the patent or copyright laws had ever intended because
36 A comparison of 11 U.S.C. § 365(h), (i), and (n) reveals that Congress sought to give
lessees and licensees the right to exercise property rights enjoyed by debtors under the
Code. Specifically, the right to assert their equitable interest in the property that has been
leased or licensed from the debtor. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h), (i), (n) (Supp. 1991).
37 As a counterpoint, it should be noted that this thesis, as applied to licenses of intel-
lectual property and leases of real and personal property, may give bankrupts more exten-
sive property rights than those contemplated or authorized under common law. Indeed, the
purpose of licenses and leases is that possession of real or intellectual property be trans-
ferred, but that title remain with the transferor.
See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
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it would allow the licensee the unilateral right to withhold its tech-
nology from the marketplace.
Consequently, the drafters limited the traditional powers of
debtors to obtain relief from onerous contracts, acknowledging that
although it is important to protect debtors from onerous contracts,
it is equally important for Congress to promote technological de-
velopment and innovation by protecting the rights of nonbankrupt
licensees.39
A. The Economic and Public Policy Issues. Addressed Under the
Act
In enacting section 365(n), Congress recognized that techno-
logical development and innovation are advanced by encouraging
solvent licensees to invest in start-up companies. Indeed, the eco-
nomic reality is that intellectual property is often developed by un-
dercapitalized companies relying on the financial support of sol-
vent licensees to provide "venture capital" for development. To
encourage investment in intellectual property and to protect the
rights of the licensees who contribute financing, research, develop-
ment, manufacturing, or marketing skills, Congress limited the
power of debtor-licensors to "reject" licenses as executory
contracts.40
As the judiciary committees observed, it would be inequitable
if a licensee who funded the development of the intellectual prop-
erty, or who invested substantial monies in anticipation of using or
marketing the technology, were denied the benefit of its bargain.4 1
It would also be unjust if the debtor or creditors' committee could
unilaterally disclose jointly developed trade secrets, patents, or
copyrightable information. 42 Such disclosures would have a devas-
tating effect on the licensee's business, possibly even causing its
bankruptcy.43 The judiciary committees compared the licensee's
predicament to that of a lessee of real property because in both
39 See S. REP., supra note 3, at 4.
40 Id. at 4-5.
41 Unfortunately, both the Senate and House Reports are silent about the funds that
the debtor-licensor may have lost in an effort to comply with its contractual obligations or
the possibility that the licensee's investment in the debtor's software is secured by a lien
against the debtor's property.
42 See S. REP., supra note 3, at 4.
"I See id. at 3 (upon licensor's rejection of agreement, licensee loses right to continued
use of intellectual property).
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instances the consequences of the debtor's breach is not compensa-
ble in monetary damages."
B. The Congressional Reaction
To prevent these consequences and encourage public invest-
ment in intellectual property, Congress modified section 365 of the
Code to enable the licensee to structure agreements protecting its
right to use and control distribution of intellectual property in the
event that the licensor files for bankruptcy protection. This modifi-
cation of section 365 of the Code in essence allowed for preban-
kruptcy planning on the part of licensees.
The drafters observed that the modification of section 365 rep-
resented a substantial curtailment of the policy of protecting debt-
ors in favor of the policy encouraging technological innovation.45
Importantly, in the legislative history of the Act, Congress advises
the bankruptcy courts to recognize agreements that foster the de-
velopment of intellectual property, even if these agreements tech-
nically contravene accepted principles of bankruptcy law.46
Consistent with the public policy of encouraging technological
innovation, the drafters enacted a broad definition of intellectual
property.47 This definition covers a wide range of licensing arrange-
ments and variants of intellectual property, including the follow-
ing: (a) trade secrets; (b) inventions, processes, designs, or plants
protected under title 35; (c) patent applications; (d) plant variety;
(e) works of authorship protected under title 17 (Copyright Act);
and (f) mask works protected under chapter 9 of title 17, "to the
extent protected by applicable non-bankruptcy law."' 48 Not all in-
" Id. at 4; see also supra note 35 (excerpt from Senate Report).
41 S. REP., supra note 3, at 3. This reallocation of priorities was necessary because:
Th[e] process [of technological development and innovation] begins with an in-
ventive concept and must proceed through an expensive and risky series of steps
including research, development, manufacturing and marketing. At each step,
both money and additional refinement of the idea are required. Often, the financ-
ing and additional refinement are only available through the participation of per-
sons other than the original innovator.
Id.
I 6 Id. at 9. As the drafters explained, the Act was "intended to restore confidence in the
system of intellectual property licensing, and courts interpreting it should be sensitive to
the reasonable practices that have and will evolve among parties seeking to add to the tech-
nological and creative wealth of America." Id.
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(56) (1988).
48 Id. § 101(57) (1988) ("[m]ask work has the meaning given to it in section 902(2) of
Title 17").
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tellectual property is covered under the Act. For example, trade
names and trade marks are explicitly omitted from protection
under the Act. Moreover, although the Act provides substantial in-
centives and protections to licensees, it does not provide any spe-
cific protections for (1) venture capital invested by licensors in
high technology companies, (2) licenses entered into between
debtor-licensees and solvent licensors, or (3) licenses of intellectual
property that are assumed and assigned to third parties.49 For ex-
ample, the drafters did not propose to protect a venture capital
licensee's investment by treating the licensee as a secured creditor,
nor did Congress attempt to examine the effect that a licensee's
vested right to the technology would have on the rights of secured
creditors. In addition, the drafters failed to address the situation in
which the debtor-licensor owns the original intellectual property,
and the licensee owns updates or supplements to the technology
that are essential to the debtor's use of the product. Finally, the
Act is silent about the degree of adequate protection that must be
provided to the licensee so as to permit assignment of the license
to third parties. In these instances, the provisions of the Act may
deviate from the judiciary committees' stated purpose of protect-
ing technological innovation.
III. THE PROTECTIONS OFFERED LICENSEES UNDER SECTION
365(n)(1)
Section 365(n), unlike most other Code provisions, was drafted
with the expectation that licensees will engage in prebankruptcy
planning. Indeed, section 365(n) explicitly allows licensees to mod-
ify contractual rights given to debtors and creditors under the
Code.50 These rights, addressed in the following subsections, in-
clude the debtor's right to (1) reject onerous executory contracts,
(2) enforce the protections of the automatic stay, (3) require notice
and a hearing before property is removed from the estate, and (4)
avoid adherence to ipso facto clauses. Although these rights are
broad, the Act places the onus of drafting on licensees. If the right
is not retained in the license, the non-Act provisions of the Code
will undoubtedly be applied to the license agreement.
4' Arguably, the assumption and assignment of executory license agreements are gov-
erned under § 365(f) of the Code.
50 S. REP., supra note 3, at 9.
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A. Section 365(n)(1)-The Licensee's Right to Retain Its Vested
Rights Under the License Agreement
Section 365(n)(1) provides that if the trustee or debtor rejects
an executory license agreement covering intellectual property, the
licensee may elect either one of the following courses of conduct:
(A) to treat [the] contract as terminated ... ; or (B) to retain its
rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provision of
such contract, but excluding any other right under applicable
nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract)
under such contract and under any agreement supplementary to
such contract ... as such rights existed immediately before the
case commenced, for-(i) the duration of such contract; and (ii)
any period for which such contract may be extended by the licen-
see as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law.51
According to the legislative history of section 365(n)(1), in the
event that the license agreement is rejected, the licensor may re-
tain the following rights under the terms of the agreement:
(a) Protection of trade secrets, copyrights, patents and confiden-
tial information against all persons including creditors;
(b) Continued exclusive use and distribution of the intellectual
property for the length of the license as well as any extensions
provided under the license or applicable law; and
(c) Enforcement of non-compete clauses against the debtor and
any successor entity.52
The drafters recognized that the term of license agreements is
often contingent upon the occurrence of certain triggering events,
such as the approval of a patent application. Accordingly, the
scope of section 365(n)(1) is not limited to contracts that have
commenced as of the filing date. Rather, "[t]he benefits of the bill
are intended to extend to such license agreements [that commence
upon a 'triggering event'], consistent with the limitation that the
licensee's rights are only in the underlying intellectual property as
it existed at the time of the filing."'53
Section 365(n)(1) does not, however, protect the licensee's
right to property that is not fully developed, nor does it provide for
reduction of royalty payments for use of such partially developed
property. Therefore, although section 365(n)(1) provides a degree
:1 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (1988) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
2 See S. REP., supra note 3, at 8-9; H.R. REP., supra note 29, at 8-9.
53 S. REP., supra note 3, at 8.
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of prospective relief generally unavailable to parties to executory
contracts, it ignores the economic reality that the licensor may file
a bankruptcy petition before it completes development of the in-
tellectual property. In that event, the contractual expectations of
the licensee will be frustrated because the licensee will have the
right to use the technology only in the form that existed as of the
filing date, despite the fact that the parties contemplated that the
licensee would benefit from the licensor's development of the tech-
nology into a more sophisticated form."
B. Potential Drafting and Practical Problems Raised by Section
365(n) (1)
Although section 365(n)(1) provides substantial benefits to
licensees who desire to retain their rights after rejection of the con-
tract, it also has several defects that affect both licensees and li-
censors. For example, section 365(n)(1) provides no means of en-
forcing the terms of the license agreement. As a result, both parties
must rely on the powers of the court to fashion an equitable rem-
edy for breach of the license agreement. 5
Additionally, allowing the licensee to obtain possession and
control of what may be the debtor's only asset violates the auto-
matic stay provisions of the Code and the express prohibition
against the ipso facto clauses. Nevertheless, under section
365(n)(1), if the license so provides, the licensee shall obtain use of
the debtor's property without seeking relief from stay. Indeed, it
would appear that the licensee may even use its common-law right
of self-help to obtain the debtor's property.
In addition, whereas section 365(e) invalidates any provision
of an executory contract (other than a license of intellectual prop-
erty) that terminates or modifies the debtor's rights under a con-
tract because of the debtor's insolvency or the initiation of bank-
ruptcy proceedings,5 the provisions of section 365(n)(1) allow the
debtor to enforce the ipso facto clauses contained in license and
See Brown, Hansen & Salerno, Technology Licenses Under Section 365(n) of the
Bankruptcy Code: The Protections Afforded the Technology User, 95 COMM. L.J. 170, 195
(1990); see also Warden & Costello, New Bankruptcy Code Section 365(n): Limited Com-
fort for the Technology License, 3 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 4-5 (1989).
" Section 105(a) of the Code authorizes the bankruptcy court to use its equitable au-
thority to "issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
" See id. § 365(e).
[Vol. 65:10451058
STRUCTURING LICENSE AGREEMENTS
escrow agreements; The power to enforce ipso facto clauses creates
the following anomaly: If the debtor assumes the license, the
debtor will not be forced to reveal the components of its intellec-
tual property to the licensee. If, however, the debtor rejects the
license contract, the escrow agreement will be triggered, and the
debtor will have to reveal its technology.
As one commentator points out, this anomaly creates a poten-
tial for abuse by the unscrupulous licensee.5 Indeed, once the
debtor loses control of the technology, an unscrupulous licensee
can utilize the technology in a manner unanticipated under the li-
cense agreement. A debtor that is preoccupied with its reorganiza-
tion efforts will often be unable to prevent such abuse. Moreover,
if the debtor is severely insolvent, it will be unable to muster a
defense and provide the proof necessary to enforce its copyright,
trade secret, or patent rights. In fact, if the copyright was not re-
corded or the patent not received, a substantial risk exists that the
technology will enter the public domain.
C. Drafting Suggestions That Protect the Licensee's Vested
Rights in Intellectual Property
To protect the licensee's rights under section 365(n)(1), the li-
cense should contain provisions that carefully define (1) the intel-
lectual property protected from dissemination and (2) the scope of
any exclusivity or distribution rights. The license agreement es-
crow provision or supplemental agreement should also fully articu-
late the rights that may be exercised by the licensee upon the
bankruptcy of the licensor.
1. Defining Intellectual Property
The property must be described in detail to protect the licen-
see's vested interest in intellectual property. A careful definition of
the property may provide licensees with greater protection under
the Code than under federal, state, and common law rules because
the Code contains a broader definition of intellectual property.58
For example, the Code makes "confidential information" a pro-
tected asset, whereas most state and federal laws do not protect
licensees from the dissemination of information in which patent,
57 See Moskowitz, Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy: New "Veto Power"
for Licensees under Section 365(n), 44 Bus. LAw. 771, 790 (May 1989).
58 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988); cf. id. § 101(52)-(53); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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copyright, or trade-secret rights have not been preserved.
Because section 365(n)(1) allows licensees to protect rights
that will mature upon the happening of a triggering event, such as
the granting of a patent application, the license agreement should
define all intellectual property rights subject to pending patent ap-
plications or that may be developed during the term of the license
agreement.
Furthermore, the license should define any embodiment of in-
tellectual property subject to the license. For example, when the
intellectual property is contained in equipment or a specialized
casing, the license should provide that, in the event that the licen-
sor files a petition for bankruptcy, the licensee may utilize an alter-
native method of obtaining the manufacture or assembly of the
equipment.
2. Defining the Scope of Distribution Rights Afforded the
Licensee
The license agreement should also define the licensee's distri-
bution rights. If there are several licensees of the property, an issue
may be raised regarding the validity of an exclusivity provision.
Indeed, creditors may urge that since the debtor-licensor has al-
ready given more than one license, the estate would be best served
if the intellectual property were mass-marketed. Accordingly, if
multiple licenses are contemplated, it may be wise to define the
contractual limits to be placed upon each licensee's distribution
rights. The limits may be as simple as stating that only a specific
number of licenses shall be given, or as complex as necessary to
cover secondary distribution by original equipment manufacturers.
In either event, the license should contain sufficient descriptive
language to justify the business reasons for limiting the number of
authorized licenses.
The license agreement should also define the scope of any
noncompetition clause that binds the debtor and any successor en-
tity. To ensure enforceability, the noncompetition clause should be
limited to a reasonable time and geographic area and otherwise
comply with applicable state and federal law.59
The license agreement should limit the ability of the licensor
See generally Hander & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 669 (1982) (thorough discussion of restrictive trade
covenants).
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or its creditors to sell the intellectual property to third parties who
will not honor the license agreement.6 0 The right to retain collat-
eral, to transfer title, and to obtain immunity from the suit de-
scribed above is extremely limited.61 To preserve this right, com-
mentators suggest that the agreement contain certain statements
to strengthen the licensee's position.62 Initially, the agreement
should provide that possession of the intellectual property, as well
as performance of the collateral obligations attendant to that pos-
session, are necessary and that their sale to a third party would
cause irreparable harm to the licensee. Furthermore, the agree-
ment should state that receipt of the intellectual property by the
licensee upon a default and a foreclosure is adequate and sufficient
consideration. Finally, the debtor should waive the "commercially
reasonable sale" requirement. Realistically, even under these cir-
cumstances, enforcement of such clauses cannot be guaranteed.
3. Defining Supplemental Agreements and Clauses
Section 365(n) does not permit the licensee to require the
debtor to work or take any affirmative acts to enforce the rights of
the licensee. Thus, if the licensee is relying on the debtor to per-
form any research and development work, the licensee or a hired
third party must now perform this work. The licensee requiring
such services should have the license agreement provide that third
60 See Duval, Defensive Drafting to Intellectual Property Agreements, 2 BANKR.
L.REv. 18, 25-26 (1990). Examples of limitations suggested by commentators include the
following:
(a)an agreement pursuant to section 9-505(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code
which provides that, upon default the licensor must allow the licensee to retain
the property, transfer title and provide the licensee with immunity from suit;
(b)an agreement that the intellectual property may not be sold to present compet-
itors; and
(c)an agreement that any sale of the intellectual property to third parties contain
provisions which require the third party to perform the collateral obligations of
the license agreement.
See id.
6' See R. NIMmR, supra note 33, 1 5.11-.12 (limitations imposed may also cause par-
ties to violate state and federal antitrust laws).
" See U.C.C. § 9-504(5) (1990).
A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, re-
purchase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the
secured party or is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of
the secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the
collateral under this Article.
Id.; see also Duval, supra note 60, at 25-26.
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parties, in the event of a bankruptcy, may assume the debtor's ob-
ligations under the contract without violating any of the trade se-
cret or exclusivity provisions of the license.
The license should further provide that payments under the
contract may be reduced to account for any reduction in services
occasioned by the rejection of the license agreement and allow the
licensee to mitigate.6 3 It should be established that any reduced
payments are not for royalties because there is no statutory basis
to deny licensors their full royalty payments, even if the terms of
the license contract are not being fully performed. Rather, section
365(n) and its legislative history expressly prohibit the licensee
from reducing royalty payments because (1) the provisions of sec-
tion 365(n)(1), which allow the licensee to enforce a rejected con-
tract, are contingent upon continued payment of royalties by the
licensee and (2) royalty obligations will be enforced regardless of
the label given to the obligation in the license or supplementary
agreement.6 4 In fact, the House Report on the Act advises the judi-
ciary that
[i]t is important that courts, in construing the term "royalty"
used in this subsection, and in deciding what payments are roy-
alty payments, look to the substance of the transaction and not
the label. The underlying nature of the payments must be consid-
ered. For example, payments based upon the use of intellectual
property or on a percentage of sales of end products that incorpo-
rate or are derived from the intellectual property should be
treated as royalty payments.65
Based upon the foregoing legislative advice, it may be best to
structure the license agreement as one for licensable rights (i.e.,
use of copyrighted information) and consulting services. This
would, in effect, create two executory contracts. Thus, if a bank-
ruptcy petition is filed and the debtor attempts to reject the con-
tract, the licensee can halt payment for the consulting services
under a breach of contract defense, while continuing to enforce the
license agreement under section 365(n) by making its full royalty
payments.
63 Duval, supra note 60, at 23.
See H.R. REP., supra note 29, at 9.
65 Id.
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4. Escrow Agreements Under Section 365(n)(1)
Section 365(n)(1) allows the licensee to enforce any rights that
the licensee may have negotiated under a supplementary agree-
ment."6 This term includes escrow agreements.6 7 Under the typical
escrow agreement, the licensor deposits a copy of the intellectual
property, such as computer software or a patented formula, with
an escrow agent. The escrow agent may be a mutually agreed upon
organization, perhaps even a law firm. The escrow agreement gen-
erally requires that the escrow agent reveal or deliver the intellec-
tual property to the licensee upon the occurrence of a triggering
event. The triggering event often includes the filing of a petition
for relief under the Code, appointment of a trustee or receiver, or a
material change in the debtor's financial condition. Under section
365(n), the debtor need not provide continuing product support af-
ter the contract is rejected.6 " Therefore, the escrow agreement
should provide that the property deposited with the escrow agent
must be updated on a monthly or weekly basis."
6 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (1988).
67 S. REP., supra note 3, at 9. The Senate Judiciary Committee observed that enforce-
ment of supplementary agreements was necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act be-
cause licenses are often only a part of the contract for development of intellectual property.
As the Senate Committee observed,
[i]ntellectual property licensing arrangements are not generally standardized.
Rather, the particular transaction is the product of the circumstances of the licen-
sor, the licensee and other interested parties. It is not unusual for the licensing
arrangements to involve parties other than the licensor and licensee. It is also not
unusual for the license agreement to be one of several agreements governing the
working relationship between the licensor and licensee. For instance, the licensor
may have contracted to supply the licensee with a product incorporating the li-
censed intellectual property and may have agreed that the licensee would only
have access to information necessary to produce the licensed intellectual property
in the event of the licensor's inability or unwillingness to supply the licensee. To
assure the licensee of access to such secret information at the defined time, the
licensor may have agreed to turn over such information to a third party to be
held in escrow until the triggering event. The third-party escrow agent would be
a party to such an agreement, and the agreement would be set forth in a docu-
ment separate from the basic license. Section 365(n)(1)(B), thus, speaks of the
retention by the licensee of rights to the intellectual property under "any agree-
ment supplementary to such contract." The licensee retains both the rights set
forth in the rejected license itself and any agreement supplementary thereto,
whether the supplementary agreement was itself the subject of a rejection by the
trustee.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
69 It should be noted that this requirement, as a practical matter, may be difficult to
obtain or enforce.
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It has been suggested that the escrow agreement be supple-
mented with a security agreement granting the licensee a property
right in the underlying intellectual property. 0 Such an agreement
would give the licensee the right to foreclose upon the collateral in
the event that the licensor failed to perform its obligations under
the license agreement. 1 In addition, such supplemental agree-
ments should contain an "after-acquired" property clause that
would grant the licensee a security interest in all intellectual prop-
erty developed by the licensor after the date of the agreement.
Although these agreements have a great deal of appeal from
the licensee's point of view, the security interest they provide to
the licensee may prevent the licensor from obtaining financing.
Moreover, these agreements are workable only if the licensee has
exclusive rights to the intellectual property.
IV. SECTION 365(n)(2)-THE DEBTOR-LICENSOR'S RIGHTS UNDER
THE CODE
Section 365(n)(2) attempts, with limited success, to balance
the benefits given to licensees under section 365(n)(1). This sub-
section virtually has eliminated the debtor's obligations to the li-
censee and has provided the estate with an unconditional income
flow.
The debtor's obligations under section 365(n)(2) are passive.
Section 365(n)(2) merely requires a licensor to "allow" the licensee
to exercise its rights under a prepetition license and any supple-
mental agreement. 2 In addition, section 365(n)(2) does not provide
a licensee with any means of enforcing its rights under the license
or supplementary agreement. Thus, if the licensor refuses to com-
ply with the terms of the license agreement, the licensee must com-
mence an action in the bankruptcy court to litigate its rights. The
drafters of the legislative history describe this "compromise" as
follows:
[Section 365(n)(2)] represents a careful compromise between the
needs of the debtor and the licensee. The licensee requires reten-
tion of its rights, even exclusive rights. No longer can the debtor
70 See Duval, supra note 60, at 24.
7'1 See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
71 Id. § 365(n)(2)(A). Thus, under § 365(n)(2), the licensee cannot, for example, require
the debtor to continue to perform software development, provide updates or document
codes granted the licensee under the escrow agreement. See id.
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expect to sell these rights through rejection. The debtors' ability
to reorganize may depend upon preservation of the royalty pay-
ments called for under the contract, free of offset or administra-
tive claims which could similarly defeat the right to royalty pay-
ments. The bill accomplishes this, but leaves unaffected the
licensee's rights under Section 365(g), so that a general claim for
damages, if any, from rejection can be asserted by the licensee.7 3
In exchange for being "allowed" to retain its rights under the
license agreement, section 365(n)(2) requires that the licensee shall
make all royalty payments designated in the license agreement for
its entire term and for any extension thereof.7 4 An extension of the
license agreement may be imposed under the term of the agree-
ment and applicable state or federal law. Unfortunately for licen-
sors, section 365(n)(2) does not provide the court with the power to
review the reasonableness of a license fee. If the royalty is below
market rates, or subsequently falls below market rates, the licensee
can require the debtor to continue the below-market rate license
for the duration of the agreement plus any extensions. Fortunately
for licensors, the converse is also true.
Section 365(n)(2) also limits the extent of the licensee's claims
against the estate. The statute provides that the licensee retains its
right to assert a damage claim but is "deemed to waive-(i) any
right of setoff it may have with respect to such contract . . . or
applicable non-bankruptcy law; and (ii) any claim allowable under
section 503(b) of this title [for administrative expenses]. ' 5
Nevertheless, as the drafters explicitly informed the judiciary,
"the bill does not [address] certain issues related to intellectual
property that are already dealt with elsewhere in the Code."'7 6
Thus, the licensor who rejects the contract and refuses to perform
its affirmative obligations may be able to secure financial conces-
sions, such as postpetition financing from the licensee, in exchange
for the guarantee of future performance of its contract.
Conversely, section 365(n)(2) does not address the licensor's
right to require the licensee to perform obligations other than the
payment of royalties. For example, the license agreement may re-
quire that the licensee market the software or conduct user groups
and report suggestions to the licensor. Indeed, the license rate may
78 S. RE ., supra note 3, at 10 (emphasis added).
7' 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B) (1988).
75 Id. § 365(n)(2)(C).
76 S. REi'., supra note 3, at 5.
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have been contingent upon the performance of these tasks. The
licensee is getting the benefit of its bargain even though the license
agreement has been rejected. Therefore, it seems fair that the li-
censee be required to continue both its monetary and nonmonetary
obligations under the license agreement. Since the Code is silent
on these points, the license agreement should contain provisions
making these nonmonetary obligations a component of the royalty
payments.
V. SECTIONS 365(n)(3) AND (4)-A STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF
THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS PROVIDED UNDER THE CODE
Sections 365(n)(3) and (4) provide that the parties to a license
may contractually alter certain procedural rights given to debtors
and creditors under the Code.
Section 365(n)(3) allows a licensee contractually to circumvent
the necessity of notice and a hearing before intellectual property is
"surrendered" to the licensee by a trustee or debtor. Instead, the
parties can agree that if the debtor rejects the license, the licensee
may require the debtor to surrender the intellectual property im-
mediately." Section 365(n)(3) further provides that the debtor
may not interfere with the licensee's right to obtain the intellectual
property from another entity.78 Although section 365(n)(3) is not a
model of clarity, it may allow the licensee to take possession of the
intellectual property from either the debtor or its escrow agent and
prevent the debtor from using the technology. Both of these acts
could be accomplished without notice and a hearing. In fact, credi-
tors who may have a security interest in the technology will have
no means of perfecting this interest or attaching the collateral.
Section 365(n)(4) of the Code provides that the licensee may
contractually alter the debtor's right to stay enforcement of an ex-
ecutory contract pending the debtor's decision to assume or re-
ject.7 9 Instead, prior to the filing of a petition, the parties can agree
that the licensor, upon written request of the licensee, shall per-
form the contract or provide the licensee with a copy of the intel-
lectual property. 0 Again, this contractual right seems to displace
" 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3)(A) (1988).
78 Id. § 365(n)(3)(B).
71 See id. § 362(a) (providing debtor's right to stay).
80 Cf. H.R. REP., supra note 29, at 9 ("The trustee also is prohibited from interfering
with the contractual rights of the licensee ... including any contractual right of the licensee
to obtain the property .... ").
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the need for a formal motion to assume or reject. More impor-
tantly, this Code provision eliminates the need for notice to the
parties in interest, before transferring property of the estate.8 1
VI. PITFALLS FOR LICENSEES
Although the Act is designed to protect the licensee's vested
interest in the intellectual property, creditors who are aware of the
license can prohibit transfer of the intellectual property to the li-
censee or invalidate the license agreement in toto by commencing
certain legal actions available under the Code and elsewhere, in-
cluding (1) injunctive relief,82 (2) avoidance of fraudulent trans-
fers,83 (3) avoidance of preferential transfers,84 or (4) bankruptcy
crimes, including fraud. 5
Additionally, the debtor or the creditors can assume the con-
tract and assign it to an undesirable or uncooperative third party.
Each of these pitfalls will be discussed below.
A. Injunctive Relief
Section 105 of the Code sets forth the broad equitable powers
of the bankruptcy court and empowers the court to take all action
necessary to "enforce or implement court orders, rules or to pre-
vent an abuse of process."8 Under this section, the bankruptcy
court is empowered to restrain a transfer of intellectual property if
such transfer constitutes an abuse of process.8 7
Likewise, section 107 of the Code provides that a bankruptcy
court can issue restraining orders to "protect an entity with respect
to a trade secret or confidential research, development, or commer-
cial information."8 8 The House Committee on the Judiciary, in-
volved in drafting section 365(n), anticipated that section 107
would be utilized to protect the trade secret or "confidentiality"
rights of the parties to the license agreement. As the committee
s1 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(4) (1988). The elimination of notice also applies to creditors. See
id. § 365(n)(4)(B).
:2 Id. §§ 105, 107.
83 See id. § 547 (this action may also be available under applicable state law).
Id. §§ 547, 548.
See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
87 See Management Technology Corp. v. Pardo (In re Management Technology Corp.),
56 Bankr. 337, 339 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985).
11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1) (1985).
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stated,
The Committee is sensitive to the need to protect confidential
material. But when adequate protection is needed, the Committee
believes that Section 107(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (11
U.S.C. 107(b)(1)) is sufficient to empower courts to afford ade-
quate protection of confidential material. 9
Section 107 is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it may
be used by the licensee to enforce provisions of the Act by protect-
ing the licensee's rights under the license or escrow agreement; on
the other hand, it gives licensors and the parties in interest the
right to move for injunctive relief to challenge the provisions of the
license agreement that authorize unfettered disclosure of the tech-
nology to third parties pursuant to the ipso facto language in the
license agreement. With respect to this issue, the congressional re-
port provides:
HR 5348 does not change the requirement under Section 365(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 365(a)) that a trustee's deci-
sion to reject an executory intellectual property license agreement
is subject to court approval. Though it is certainly not the only
time the matter could be raised, a licensor-trustee concerned
about protecting confidential information could ask the court to
afford such protection under Section 107 at the same time the
court weighs approval.90
If injunctive relief is granted, the timing benefits of section 365(n)
will be eliminated. Instead, continued research, development,
marketing, and production will be terminated or severely im-
paired pending a final determination by the court.
B. Voidable Transfers Under Sections 548 and 547 of the Code
Although section 365(n) grants licensees of intellectual prop-
erty the power to structure licenses that are not subject to the au-
tomatic stay provisions of the Code and that allow the licensee to
obtain property of the estate without the approval of the debtor,
trustee, and creditors, licensees should avoid transactions that ap-
pear to be fraudulent or overreaching. Indeed, the legislative his-
tory indicates that any reference to "non-interference by the trus-
tee [in section 365(n)] is not intended to imply that the rights of
the licensee enjoy any protection from the Trustee's avoiding
89H.R. REP., supra note 29, at 7 (footnote omitted).
90 Id.
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power under sections 544 to 549 of the Code." 91 Sections 544
through 549 of the Code contain the "strong arm" or "avoiding"
powers of the Code.
For example, a license agreement may be challenged by the
debtor, trustee, or creditors as a fraudulent or preferential transfer
under sections 548 and 547 of the Code.2 Since section 101(40) of
the Code defines "transfer" very broadly to include "every mode,
direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involun-
tary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property, including retention of title as a security interest," 9 a li-
cense agreement certainly constitutes a conditional transfer of an
interest in property.
1. Licenses as Fraudulent Transfers
Section 548, the antifraud provisions of the Code covering
fraudulent transfers, provides the following:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that
was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer incurred such obligation with ac-
tual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to
which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that
such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was
made or such obligation was incurred, or became insol-
vent as a result of such transfer or obligation;(ii) was en-
gaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage
in business or a transaction, for which any property re-
maining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capi-
tal; or (iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor
would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's
ability to pay as such debts matured.9'
,1 16 BANKR. L. ED. 186 (1981).
92 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1988).
93 Id. § 101(40) (emphasis added).
Id. § 548(a).
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a. Section 548(a)(1)-The actual intent requirement
Section 548(a)(1) requires a showing of "actual intent" to hin-
der creditors and must be proved by "clear and convincing evi-
dence. ' 95 Courts have observed that
"[a]ctual intent" in the context of fraudulent transfers of prop-
erty is rarely susceptible to proof and must be gleaned from infer-
ences drawn from a course of conduct. A general plan to strip the
debtor of its assets without regard to the needs of its creditors
"can support a finding of actual intent."96
Courts have also inferred actual intent from the conduct of related
parties. In these instances, some courts have applied a "foresee-
ability" standard. Thus, if the parties could have foreseen the ef-
fect of the transfer, they are deemed to have intended the result.9 7
Some courts have found a presumption of fraud when a trans-
fer occurs between two corporations controlled by the same par-
ties. These courts determined that
[w]here principals of a debtor attempt to transfer corporate assets
to a newly created corporate entity, which they also control, the
transaction is fraudulent when the new corporation is merely a
continuation of the debtor, controlled by the same persons, and
made up essentially of the same assets and resources as the old
corporation.""
Fraud will also be presumed when the transfer occurs between two
corporations controlled by the same officers and directors.
In addition, "certain 'badges of fraud' can form the basis for a
finding of actual intent."9 The "indicia" of fraud include the
following:
1. a relationship between the debtor and the transferee;
95 Metro Shippers, Inc. v. Saviello (In re Metro Shippers, Inc.), 78 Bankr. 747, 751
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
" Wieboldt Stores v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting In re
Vecchrione, 407 F. Supp. 609, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)).
97 See United States v. Glen Eagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 581 (M.D. Pa. 1983),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied sub nom. McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). Apply-
ing state fraudulent transfer laws, the Glen Eagles court concluded, "[I]f the parties could
have foreseen the effect on creditors resulting from [the LBO], .... the parties must be
deemed to have intended the same." Id.
" In re F & C Servs. Inc., 44 Bankr. 863, 868 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
19 Wieboldt Stores, 94 Bankr. at 504 (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY % 548.02 [5]
(15th ed. 1987)).
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2. lack of consideration for the conveyance;
3. insolvency or indebtedness of the debtor;
4. transfer of the debtor's entire estate;
5. reservation of benefits, control or dominion by the debtor;
6. secrecy or concealment of the transaction; and
7. pendency or threat of litigation at time of transfer.100
If a majority of these indicators are present, the license agree-
ment may be subject to attack as fraudulent under section
548(a)(1). These standards could create problems for a licensee
who has provided the licensor with a substantial investment of
venture capital, or a licensee who is the marketing subsidiary of
the licensor or its parent. Such a licensee could be considered an
insider 0 ' or an affiliate 02 of the debtor-licensor. The court can ex-
amine the terms of the license agreement and determine whether
the license was in reality a transfer made in exchange for a prior
capital contribution or an attempt to defraud creditors. Alterna-
tively, if the licensor requires the licensee to perform any capital-
intensive services, and these responsibilities precipitate a bank-
ruptcy filing, the court or third parties may question the licensee's
"ulterior motive" for the transaction. 0 3
b. Under section 548(a)(2), constructive fraud will suffice
Even if actual fraud cannot be found, the court may find con-
structive fraud under section 548(a)(2). Constructive fraud arises if
the debtor received less than "reasonably equivalent value" for the
license, and
(i) the licensor either was insolvent on the date of the transfer
or became insolvent as a result of the transfer;
(ii) the remaining property of the company is unreasonably
small for the company to continue its business operations; or
(iii) the licensor intended to incur, or believes that it would
have incurred, debts beyond its ability to pay if these debts
100 See In re Warner, 87 Bankr. 199, 202 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (citation omitted).
101 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1988).
102 Id. § 101(2).
"I0 -United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1296 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied sub noma. McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
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were to become due.104
When intellectual property is licensed pursuant to a joint mar-
keting or joint development arrangement, it is difficult, if not im-
possible, to determine whether "reasonably equivalent value" was
given.105 This determination is especially difficult if the product
has no ascertainable market value either because it has not been
fully developed or is the first of its kind. If the parties are at arm's
length, it may be reasonable to assume that reasonably equivalent
value was given. When the parties are subsidiaries of the same par-
ent or when they are joint venturers, however, the court will scruti-
nize intensely all aspects of the transaction.0 6
Moreover, if the licensee is dealing with a start-up company,
the company is often insolvent or rendered insolvent by its obliga-
tions under the license or development contract. Indeed, most
start-up companies anticipate that they will operate at a loss dur-
ing the development process and will not show a profit until sev-
eral years after the initial beta test of the product. Accordingly, it
is suggested that the license should contain a means of appraising
the property in the event of a bankruptcy. Although this valuation
mechanism would not be binding on the bankruptcy court, it could
provide some guidance to the court in determining value.
2. Preferential Transfers
The trustee, debtor, or creditors may also seek to avoid a li-
cense agreement as a preferential transfer. Section 547 of the Code
defines these transfers as
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
101 It would be equally difficult to value intellectual property even if it were not a joint
venture, especially if the property had a highly specialized use or limited market.
106 See generally Factory Tire Distribs., Inc. v. Macartie (In re Factory Tire Distribs.,
Inc.), 64 Bankr. 335, 337-38 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (fraudulent transfer found where less
than equivalent value exchanged between sister corporations).
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filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such
transfer was an insider;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such
creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of the title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the
extent provided by the provisions of this title.10 7
A transfer of intellectual property may be deemed preferential
if the royalties are, in realty, a repayment of preexisting debts held
by the licensee or its parent corporation. If, however, these royalty
payments fit within the provisions of section 547(c), they are not
preferences.108 It can be argued that royalties given in exchange for
exclusive use and distribution rights of software are transactions in
the ordinary course of business and constitute a contemporaneous
exchange for new value.
3. One-Sided Drafting of a License May Constitute a Bankruptcy
Crime
Section 152 of title 18 of the United States Code provides
criminal penalties for the commission of "bankruptcy crimes."109
101 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
105 Id. § 547(c). The provisions of section 547(c) state that a trustee may not avoid a
transfer under the following circumstances:
(1) the transfer was intended to be a contemporaneous exchange for a new value;
(2) the transfer was in payment of the debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) the transfer created a security interest in property acquired by the debtor which secures
new value;
(4) the transfer was to or for the benefit of a creditor who gave new value to or for the
benefit of the debtor;
(5) the transfer creates a perfected security interest in inventory or receivable, or the pro-
ceeds of either;
(6) the transfer relates to the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under Section
545 of the Code; or
(7) if the case is filed by an individual debtor, the aggregate value of all property that con-
stitutes or is affected by the transfer is less than $600. Id.
109 See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988). A bankruptcy crime is committed by anyone who, among
other things, knowingly and fraudulently
[1] conceals from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court
charged with the control or custody of property, or from creditors in any case
under title 11, any property belonging to the estate of a debtor; or
[2] ... receives any material amount of property from a debtor after the filing of a
case under title 11, with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11; or
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The penalty for the commission of a bankruptcy crime includes a
fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than
five years, or both.110 Accordingly, licensors should not use the li-
censing mechanism to "sell" or "transfer" technology in order to
avoid paying creditors.
Clearly, if the license agreement is entered into as a means of
transferring assets out of a company prior to the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition, the conspiring parties may be held liable for the
commission of a bankruptcy crime.
VII. ASSUMPTION AND ASSIGNMENT TO THIRD PARTIES-THE
LICENSOR'S ULTIMATE WEAPON
Although section 365(n) governs the assumption or rejection of
a technology license, it makes no reference to, or prohibition
against, the assignment of a technology license. Thus, commenta-
tors have observed that the licensor's ability to assign a technology
license is governed by section 365(f) of the Code.1  This assump-
tion seems to be contrary to the letter and spirit of section 365(n).
A. The Dilemma
Notwithstanding any provision in the contract to the contrary,
section 365(f) provides that the debtor or the trustee may assign to
a third party an executory contract if such contract is assumed and
if adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee is pro-
vided.112 Since adequate performance of the license agreement is
not defined in the Code or case law, this section can result in a
substantial threat to a licensee. Clearly, enforcement of an assign-
ment could impair the provisions in a license agreement that re-
quire that the licensor uphold an exclusive licensing arrangement
or that the licensor limit distribution of the product to certain ven-
dors. Indeed, the contract may be assigned to a competitor of the
licensor. Because adequate protection is not defined by the Code,
[3] ... eitherindividually or as an agent or officer of any person or corporation, in
contemplation of a case under title 11 by or against him or any other person or
corporation, or with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11, . . . transfers or
conceals any of his property or the property of such other person or corporation.
See id.
110 Id.
1 See Brown, Hansen & Salerno, supra note 54, at 198.
11 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2) (1988).
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and because section 365(n) does not contain any provisions for the
adequate protection of licensors of intellectual property, it will be
difficult to argue that adequate protection includes assurance that
the property will not be transferred to the licensor's competitors.
Furthermore, there is a substantial risk that the assignor will not
have the same level of skill required to maintain, service, or update
the technology. In that instance, the licensee will be in an awkward
situation because it will not be able to enforce the rights it would
have obtained upon rejection of the contract-namely, the right to
obtain the intellectual property from the escrow agent, and it will
be forced to deal with an undesirable licensee or competitor.
B. Some Possible Solutions
Commentators have suggested that this potential problem
should be addressed in the license agreement by defining adequate
assurance of future performance. 113 Although this provision would
not be enforceable under either section 365(g) or (n), it could pro-
vide the court with suggested terms that an order authorizing the
assignment of the technology license may contain. For example,
the license could provide that any assignment would require that
the assignee assume all of the debtor's obligations under the tech-
nology license. The license should also provide that certain net
worth or capital requirements be met by the assignee to ensure
that the service, maintenance, and research and development obli-
gations originally bargained for can be completed. In addition, the
contract may provide that the licensee shall have a right of first
refusal to purchase the contract from the debtor instead of ac-
cepting the assignment.
An alternative method of prohibiting an assignment might be
to provide that the contract involves personal services. This ap-
proach would require that the key persons involved in developing
the technology be identified. If these persons can no longer per-
form the work, the licensee would have the option of terminating
the contract.
CONCLUSION
Although section 365(n) of the Code clarifies some of the
rights and responsibilities of licensees and licensors in the event of
"3 See Brown, Hansen & Salerno, supra note 54, at 198.
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a bankruptcy, it is by no means clear that license agreements
drafted in compliance with section 365(n) will be enforceable as
intended. Indeed, since there is little case law on point, it is diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the agreements drafted by learned practi-
tioners will be enforced by the courts. In addition, section 365(n)
contains substantial "loopholes" that may allow debtors to escape
from its requirements. In this regard, overzealous licensees should
heed the adage, "Be careful of what you ask for because you may
get it."
Under section 365(n), debtors can avoid many of the require-
ments of an onerous license agreement by simply assuming and as-
signing the agreement. Assignment of the agreement poses the
greatest danger under section 365(n) because the assignment may
be made to a competitor or to a party totally incapable of perform-
ing under the license agreement. Since the original licensor is
bankrupt and presumably unable to perform under the license
agreement, the licensee may be in a situation in which not only has
it lost the benefit of its bargain, but it is required to pay the royal-
ties to a party who is not providing adequate performance.
Therefore, after reviewing section 365(n), its legislative his-
tory, and correlative portions of the Code that impact upon it, it is
suggested that the party drafting the license agreement proceed
cautiously and advise the client of the substantial risks associated
with drafting any license agreement. In fact, when valuable tech-
nology is involved, perhaps the best advice is the oldest ad-
vice-possession is nine-tenths of the law.
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